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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Lazy Days’ R.V. Center, Inc. and LDRV Holding 
Corp. (collectively, the Reorganized Debtors) appeal an order 
of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware that vacated an order of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court.  According to the District Court, the 
Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion 
to reopen filed by the Reorganized Debtors.  Because we 
disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the 
Bankruptcy Court issued an advisory opinion, we will reverse 
the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
 Appellee I-4 Land Holding Limited Co. owns a parcel 
of land in Florida.  In July 1999, I-4 leased that land to Lazy 
Days pursuant to a written lease (Lease) that gave Lazy Days 
an option to purchase the property subject to certain 
conditions not relevant here.  The Lease also prohibited Lazy 
Days from “assign[ing] or transfer[ring]” its interest in the 
Lease “without the prior written consent of” I-4, except to 
related entities under certain circumstances.  App. 1249.  
Beginning in 2008, Lazy Days failed to pay rent as it came 
due and informed I-4 of its intention to file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy and assign the Lease to LDRV. 
 Prior to filing a petition under Chapter 11, Lazy Days 
negotiated with I-4 and reached a settlement agreement in 
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October 2009 (the Settlement Agreement), pursuant to which 
I-4 consented to Lazy Days’s assignment of the Lease to 
LDRV.  As part of the Settlement Agreement, Lazy Days 
agreed not to “argue against the Bankruptcy Court abstaining 
from consideration of Lease interpretation issues . . . except to 
the extent necessary in connection with the assumption and 
assignment of the Lease as contemplated herein.”  App. 1485.  
The Settlement Agreement also provided that “there is no 
intent to, nor is the Lease modified in any respect and the 
Lease and all terms and conditions thereof remain in full 
force and effect.”  App. 1487.  It did not explicitly state 
whether the purchase option would survive, however. 
 In November 2009, Lazy Days filed a Chapter 11 
petition.  The Bankruptcy Court confirmed a reorganization 
plan incorporating the Settlement Agreement in December 
2009 and closed the case in March 2010.  Thereafter, the 
Lease was assigned to LDRV. 
 On May 12, 2011, LDRV attempted to exercise the 
purchase option, but I-4 refused to honor it.  On June 1 and 
June 7, 2011, the parties each filed lawsuits in Florida state 
court seeking a determination of their respective rights under 
the Lease.  Also on June 7, the Reorganized Debtors filed an 
emergency motion to reopen in the Bankruptcy Court, 
seeking a ruling that the Lease’s anti-assignment provision 
was unenforceable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(3), which 
renders unenforceable any “provision in an . . . unexpired 
lease of the debtor . . . that terminates or modifies . . . a right . 
. . under such . . . lease on account of an assignment” of the 
lease.  Nine days later, after allowing I-4 to file an opposition 
and holding a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 
anti-assignment provision was unenforceable and that I-4’s 
refusal to honor the purchase option violated the Settlement 
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Agreement.  The Bankruptcy Court then ordered I-4 to honor 
the option. 
 I-4 appealed to the District Court, which vacated the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order, holding  that the Bankruptcy 
Court’s judgment was an advisory opinion directed at the 
Florida state courts.  The Reorganized Debtors now appeal. 
II 
The Reorganized Debtors invoked the Bankruptcy 
Court’s jurisdiction under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b).  The District 
Court had jurisdiction over the appeal of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  In 
reviewing the Bankruptcy Court proceedings, we apply the 
same standard as the District Court.  Accordingly, we review 
the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations de novo, its 
findings of historical fact for clear error, and its decision to 
reopen for abuse of discretion.  See In re Zinchiak, 406 F.3d 
214, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2005). 
III 
We first consider whether the Bankruptcy Court had 
jurisdiction to reopen the proceedings.  The District Court 
held that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction because 
the Bankruptcy Court issued an advisory opinion.  In addition 
to the District Court’s holding, I-4 offers alternative grounds 
for affirmance.  In I-4’s view, the Bankruptcy Court lacked 
statutory subject matter jurisdiction and constitutional 
authority to reopen the case and it was required to abstain 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c).  We will address these three 
arguments seriatim. 
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A 
 Federal courts have no jurisdiction to render advisory 
opinions.  Put another way, they “may not decide questions 
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before 
them or give opinions advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts.”  Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 
1017, 1023 (2013) (citation, internal quotation marks, and 
alteration omitted).  In this case, the Bankruptcy Court issued 
a two-page decree, declaring the anti-assignment clause 
invalid and ordering I-4 to honor the purchase option.  
Because this decree actually invalidated the anti-assignment 
clause and ordered the parties to do something, it “affect[ed] 
the rights of litigants,” id., and was not an advisory opinion.  
See In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(bankruptcy court opinion was not advisory when it “resolved 
the litigation”). 
 Relying on the opinion of a panel of this Court in In re 
Martin’s Aquarium, Inc., 98 F. App’x 911 (3d Cir. 2004), I-4 
argues that the Bankruptcy Court issued an advisory opinion 
because the Reorganized Debtors sought the Bankruptcy 
Court’s judgment in order to influence the state proceedings.  
Apart from the fact that it has no precedential value, Martin’s 
Aquarium is easily distinguishable from this case.  There, the 
Bankruptcy Court issued a judgment that was entered in the 
Pennsylvania state courts.  Id. at 912.  One party filed 
motions to stay execution claiming that the judgments were 
fraudulently entered.  Id.  While those motions were pending 
in state court, the other party moved to reopen in the 
bankruptcy court “for the purpose of seeking confirmation of 
the Judgment.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted).  The bankruptcy court acknowledged that “the 
underlying dispute centers around the interpretation of 
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Pennsylvania law, not federal bankruptcy law,” yet agreed to 
reopen “for the limited purpose of ruling that [its earlier 
order] was a judgment within the meaning of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(a).”  Id. at 912 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The bankruptcy court’s opinion that its earlier 
judgment was a judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure did nothing to resolve whether the Pennsylvania 
courts would be required to abide by it under Pennsylvania 
procedural rules.  Thus, the opinion had no legal effect; it was 
merely advisory. 
Unlike in Martin’s Aquarium, here the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order had the legal effect of voiding the anti-
assignment clause.  Thus, its opinion was not advisory, 
regardless of whether the Reorganized Debtors sought to 
impact the state proceedings.  See Matter of Shondel, 950 
F.2d 1301, 1309 (7th Cir. 1991) (bankruptcy court decision 
modifying its previous injunction to allow a wrongful death 
claimant to proceed in state court against a bankrupt estate 
“gave actual relief” and was therefore not advisory); cf. 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 143, 151 
(2009) (bankruptcy court had jurisdiction “to enjoin 26 Direct 
Actions pending in state courts” when those actions violated 
its order).  Accordingly, even were we inclined to follow 
Martin’s Aquarium in this appeal, it would be unavailing to I-
4. 
B 
 Having determined that the Bankruptcy Court did not 
issue an advisory opinion, we next address I-4’s contention 
that the Bankruptcy Court lacked statutory subject matter 
jurisdiction over the motion to reopen. 
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 As a preliminary matter, we note that the question of 
whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to confirm the 
reorganization plan that included the Settlement Agreement in 
the first place is not before us, as no party challenged the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction over that proceeding.  See 
Travelers, 557 U.S. at 148, 151–52 (“Once the [initial orders] 
became final on direct review (whether or not proper 
exercises of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and power), they 
became res judicata to the parties and . . . even subject-matter 
jurisdiction may not be attacked collaterally.” (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted)).  Thus, “the only 
question left is whether the Bankruptcy Court had subject-
matter jurisdiction to enter the” 2011 order that is the subject 
of this appeal.  See id. at 151. 
 Under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), a bankruptcy court may 
reopen a closed case “to administer assets, to accord relief to 
the debtor, or for other cause.”  We have interpreted § 350(b) 
to give “bankruptcy courts . . . broad discretion to reopen 
cases after an estate has been administered.”  Zinchiak, 406 
F.3d at 223.  “In exercising its discretion to reopen, a 
bankruptcy court should consider whether similar 
proceedings are already pending in state court as well as 
make a determination as to which forum—state court or 
bankruptcy court—is most appropriate to adjudicate the 
issues raised by a motion to reopen.”  See id. at 225.  In 
Zinchiak, we found that a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction 
under § 350(b) to reopen a proceeding to determine whether 
“the filing of a deficiency petition . . . was encompassed 
within, and thus barred by, the automatic stay” the bankruptcy 
court had modified in an earlier issued order.  Id. at 223–24.  
We noted that this issue was “properly to be decided by the 
Bankruptcy Court after reopening” because the bankruptcy 
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court was “well suited to provide the best interpretation of its 
own order.”  Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We reached this conclusion even though “several related 
deficiency actions were pending in Pennsylvania state 
courts.”  Id. at 225. 
 As in Zinchiak, here the Bankruptcy Court was asked 
to reopen proceedings to resolve a dispute regarding the 
Settlement Agreement it had previously confirmed.  And 
because the Bankruptcy Court here was “well suited to 
provide the best interpretation of its own order,” id. at 224, it 
had jurisdiction to reopen.  See Travelers, 557 U.S. at 151 
(“[T]he only question left is whether the Bankruptcy Court 
had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the Clarifying Order.  
The answer here is easy: . . . the Bankruptcy Court plainly 
had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior 
orders.”). 
C 
 Relying on three Supreme Court decisions, I-4 next 
argues that the Bankruptcy Court unconstitutionally asserted 
subject matter jurisdiction over a private rights dispute.  See 
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); Granfinanciera, 
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); N. Pipeline Const. Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  But all three 
of those cases dealt with the difficult question of when a 
bankruptcy court may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction 
over common law claims.  See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611 
(bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to “resolve 
and enter final judgment on a state common law claim”); 
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55–56 (bankruptcy court lacked 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a fraudulent conveyance claim by a 
bankruptcy trustee against a third party because fraudulent 
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transfer claims “are quintessentially suits at common law that 
more nearly resemble state-law contract claims brought by a 
bankrupt corporation to augment the bankruptcy estate than 
they do creditors’ hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata 
share of the bankruptcy res”); N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (bankrupt debtor sued a third party 
for “breach of contract, misrepresentation, and other counts 
which are the stuff of the traditional actions at common law 
tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789”). 
 By contrast, the Bankruptcy Court in this case did not 
decide a question of state common law, but rather determined 
whether, in light of 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(3), an anti-assignment 
clause survived the Settlement Agreement it had confirmed as 
part of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Here, the Reorganized 
Debtors’ claim for relief was based on a federal bankruptcy 
law provision with no common law analogue, so the Stern 
line of cases is plainly inapposite.  See, e.g., Travelers, 557 
U.S. 137 (a pre-Stern case deciding a bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction to enjoin state law actions without citing either 
Granfinanciera or Northern Pipeline). 
D 
 Finally, I-4 argues that the Bankruptcy Court was 
required to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), which 
requires abstention from certain “proceeding[s] based upon a 
State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case 
under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case 
under title 11.”  As we noted already, although this 
proceeding may have been provoked by state court actions 
and surely impacted them, the proceeding in the Bankruptcy 
Court was founded upon a quintessentially federal claim, viz., 
whether the anti-assignment clause was invalid under 11 
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U.S.C. § 365(f)(3).  Furthermore, this dispute “aris[es] in a 
case under title 11” as the Bankruptcy Court was asked to 
interpret and enforce a reorganization plan which was entered 
as part of Lazy Days’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
 I-4’s argument that the Reorganized Debtors agreed 
not to argue against abstention is also unavailing.  The 
Settlement Agreement provided that the Reorganized Debtors 
would not argue against abstention “except to the extent 
necessary in connection with the assumption and assignment 
of the Lease as contemplated herein.”  App. 1485.  That 
exception plainly applies because this proceeding was 
brought “in connection with the . . . assignment of the Lease.” 
III 
 Having concluded that the Bankruptcy Court properly 
exercised jurisdiction over this dispute, we now address I-4’s 
challenges to the Bankruptcy Court’s order on the merits.  In 
particular, I-4 argues that: (1) the parties agreed to waive the 
application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(3) in the Settlement 
Agreement; (2) the Bankruptcy Court committed a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment; and (3) the Bankruptcy Court 
denied I-4 due process.  We are unpersuaded by any of these 
arguments. 
A 
 I-4’s first argument is premised on the claim that “the 
unambiguous plain language of the Settlement Agreement 
result[ed] in the elimination of the Purchase Option.”  I-4 Br. 
50.  However, the section of the Settlement Agreement I-4 
cites provides merely that LDRV “agrees that it shall remain 
liable for all obligations on the Lease, after assignment.”  
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App. 1480.  Another section of the Settlement Agreement 
states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement, 
there is no intent to, nor is the Lease modified in any respect 
and the Lease and all terms and conditions thereof remain in 
full force and effect.”  App. 1487.  Even assuming arguendo 
that the parties may waive the protections of § 365(f)(3), 
neither of these provisions unambiguously eliminates the 
purchase option, as both could be read to mean that LDRV 
steps into Lazy Days’s shoes and acquires all the rights and 
obligations that Lazy Days had, notwithstanding any anti-
assignment provisions. 
 Our reading of the Settlement Agreement is buttressed 
by two factors.  First, one of its essential purposes was for I-4 
to consent to the assignment of the Lease.  To that end, I-4 
agreed to “hereby waive the asserted defaults of Tenant 
consenting to the commencement of a bankruptcy and the 
contemplated assignment of the Lease without notice to the 
Landlord and Landlord’s written consent.”  App. 1480.  This 
provision is most naturally read to give LDRV the same 
rights in the Lease that Lazy Days had, including the purchase 
option.  Second, the principle established by § 365(f)(3) is 
that anti-assignment clauses are unenforceable in bankruptcy.  
As “contracts . . . are enacted against a background of 
common-sense understandings and legal principles that the 
parties may not have bothered to incorporate expressly but 
that operate as default rules to govern in the absence of a 
clear expression of the parties’ intent that they not govern,” 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. 
Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000), we do not read the 
Settlement Agreement to waive § 365(f)(3). 
 I-4 also argues that the Reorganized Debtors waited 
too long to seek to void the anti-assignment clause, and that 
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the Bankruptcy Court impermissibly modified the Settlement 
Agreement after it had been substantially consummated.  
These two arguments fail for the same reason.  Because the 
Reorganized Debtors could have reasonably read the purchase 
option to survive the Settlement Agreement, they would have 
had no reason to sue to enforce the option until I-4 actually 
decided not to honor it.  Soon after I-4 refused to honor the 
purchase option, the Reorganized Debtors brought suit to 
vindicate their rights.  Likewise, the Bankruptcy Court did not 
modify the Settlement Agreement, but only clarified that it 
did not void that option. 
B 
 I-4 next argues that the Bankruptcy Court’s order was 
a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  We disagree.  The 
Bankruptcy Court did not take any of I-4’s established 
property rights, but rather adjudicated the parties’ bona fide 
dispute regarding their rights under the Settlement 
Agreement.  This sort of adjudication of disputed and 
competing claims cannot be a taking.  See Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Env’t Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2612–13 (2010) (“The Takings Clause only protects 
property rights as they are established . . . , not as they might 
have been established or ought to have been established.”). 
C 
 Finally, I-4 argues that the Bankruptcy Court violated 
its due process rights by not allowing it to “present its case in 
a meaningful way” and “address[] the effect of Bankruptcy 
Code § 365 in the context of the consensual assignment of the 
Lease.”  I-4 Br. 58.  In particular, I-4 argues that, under 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001, the Bankruptcy 
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Court should have held an adversary proceeding to determine 
the enforceability of the anti-assignment clause rather than 
proceeding by motion. 
 As for I-4’s more general due process argument, the 
record shows that I-4 was able to present its case—it filed a 
lengthy opposition to LDRV’s motion for reopening, and the 
Bankruptcy Court conducted a hearing with oral argument on 
that motion. 
 I-4’s specific challenge based on Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 7001 is also unpersuasive.  Although 
that rule provides that “a proceeding to determine the validity, 
priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property” must 
be an “adversary proceeding” subject to the procedural rules 
in Part VII of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure as a general 
matter, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2), this case is different 
because the Bankruptcy Court was only adjudicating a motion 
to reopen in order to interpret and enforce its existing prior 
order.  This procedural posture renders many of the 
requirements of an adversary proceeding (such as a formal 
complaint and service of process) superfluous.  As explained 
by one bankruptcy court: 
While it is true as a general proposition that a 
claim to recover money or property or to obtain 
an injunction or other equitable relief must be 
brought as an adversary proceeding, that 
general rule is not applicable to this case. In this 
case, the Debtors are merely seeking to enforce 
an order already in place. The case was 
originally brought by the Debtors as an 
adversary proceeding. The adversary 
proceeding was resolved by a Settlement 
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Agreement pursuant to which we issued the 
order the Debtors now seek to enforce. Thus, 
we conclude that an adversary proceeding is not 
necessary where the relief sought is the 
enforcement of an order previously obtained. 
In re WorldCorp, Inc., 252 B.R. 890, 895 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2000).  And although we have not previously said so, the 
Fourth Circuit has held that adversary proceedings are not 
required for motions to reopen.  See In re Collins, 173 F.3d 
924, 929 (4th Cir. 1999) (“An adversary proceeding . . . is not 
required to reopen a case because the bankruptcy court’s 
power to reopen flows from its jurisdiction over debtors and 
their estates.”); see also In re Ellett, 254 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th 
Cir. 2001).  We now join that court and hold that an adversary 
proceeding is not required for a bankruptcy court to reopen a 
case. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand the case. 
 
